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ABSTRACT

The evolving patterns of authority in the higher education systems of countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are reviewed. Attention is directed to the major characteristics of the traditional patterns of authority, pressures for changed experiences during the transformation from elite to mass institutions, the process of reform, and the contents of reform at both the central level and within institutions. The following five traditional, modes of governance are briefly examined: The Continental or European mode, the British mode, the American mode, the Japanese mode, and the Yugoslavian mode. Pressures for change with respect to higher education governance include: the growth of higher education, the need for coordination of the larger higher education enterprise, the impact of student unrest and demands, the change in status of intermediate and junior teaching staff, and broader social and policy trends, including efforts to boost regional and local self-governance. All OECD countries have strengthened their central capacity for policy analysis and coordination in higher education in recent decades. In all OECD countries higher education now occupies a more prominent role on the political agenda than before the period of explosive growth in the 1950s and 1960s, and there has been a trend toward participative forms of governance within institutions. Additionally, bureaucracy increased in higher education, probably because of size and of multiplication of purposes. A summary of Working Group Three's discussion of institutional autonomy, participation, and decision-making is appended, along with a bibliography. (SW)

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POLICIES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 80s

Intergovernmental Conference

12th-14th October 1981

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New patterns of authority in higher education

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INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON POLICIES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE EIGHTIES

WORKING GROUP 3

NEW PATTERNS OF AUTHORITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Chairman: Catherine Wallace
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E.11935

NEW PATTERNS OF AUTHORITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Analysing the mechanisms of authority and its distribution can be approached from a number of disciplines - at the very least, political science, administration and management, and sociology. These analytical approaches overlap, and occasionally converge, but are by no means the same. In addition, authority, autonomy and participation in higher education are perceived differently from inside and from outside; authority is almost always too weak when it is in our hands, and too great when it is in those of others. Considerable diversity was thus a feature of the discussions in Working Party No. 3, whilst nevertheless showing common evolutions.

1. The purpose of the discussion was to examine new forms of relations between partners involved in higher education which could promote the adoption and development of new functions in response to changes in the social environment. The discussions were analytical rather than prospective, analysis being in any case a pre-condition for positive proposals.

2. The Working Group addressed itself to four themes, being the four questions set out in the Overview document (page 59, paragraph 9) and discussed in paragraphs 10-34 of that paper:

(1) Does higher education deserve special treatment?
(2) What does autonomy mean today?
(3) Participation and the decision-making process.
(4) Trade-off between democracy and efficiency?

The way in which participants responded to these four issues appears to us to have been determined, as was to be expected, by their preconceptions concerning higher education and universities in particular, their experience in their home country, and their positions in the institutions. While discussion did not consistently take this form, two separate approaches to the question could be discerned with a range of responses in each case.

3. Mr. Gutierrez, author of the Spanish contribution Autonomy and Social Control in Higher Education, suggested the question "Who is the university?" as a starting point. Historically, the existence of very different replies can be noted:

- the professors (teaching body);
- the community of teachers and students;
- all members of the teaching body, students and administrative staff;
- the Church, the State, a foundation within which the university would be only one part, with the teaching body as employees and the students as users;
- more complex bodies including representatives from various community groups (local authorities, business, trade unions, interest groups), alumni, professors, students and non teaching staff, representatives of the community having the final decision authority.

According to the response there will be a different attitude towards the specific characteristics of higher education, autonomy, and the questions of participation and democracy.

4. The majority of participants appeared to start implicitly from a different formulation, in turn generating a wide range of positions: what is the essential function of higher education?

5. For Mr. Rivier (Council of Europe), and for Mr. Osaki (Japan), higher education's function is research, or teaching and research taken as the quest for an endlessly inaccessible truth that entails constant questioning. By stressing research, the purpose is to show that this function - rather than other functions equally important for society - gives the university its distinctive feature.

6. Set against Mr. Guterriez's stance, this approach would seem to make the teaching body the true subjects of higher education. Moreover, it introduces a sharp division between the universities and institutions doing research, and the other higher education establishments, with the discussions on both autonomy and participation referring to the first group only. Some participants pointed out that this difference was due less to the nature of research - applied or fundamental - than to the existence of a tie between teaching and research (Mr. Premfors, Sweden; Mr. Sims, United Kingdom).

7. For Mr. Girod de l'Ain (France), higher education has always had a twofold function: vocational and research and cultural education. So the principal divide does not lie between the universities on the one hand and the remaining institutions on the other, but cuts across the universities themselves, with the faculties of medicine, architecture, law, etc. lying on the vocational side. The partners accordingly differ from case to case, the essential partners of the vocational faculties being the specialists in those branches rather than the State or the community, so that the concepts of autonomy and participation are bound to take on a different meaning.

8. For Mr. Ringborg, the aim of changing the patterns of authority is to make the university system more responsive to the diverse needs that society expresses. In principle, there is no difference in kind between the various post-secondary institutions even if the traditional research

function of the university requires special attention and protection. The major issue becomes communication between the various parts of the community, which can best take place at decentralised levels; the TUAC Delegate, Mr. Westerlund, commented that such communication should not reproduce the inequalities between social groups. To avoid that, more co-operation with trade unions and other popular movements should be recommended. But the main reason was the Unions capability to reflect the needs of working life. It is clear that the Swedish position comes close to the last of the replies proposed by Mr. Guterriez.

9. The replies to the four questions listed above may now be briefly summarised, bearing in mind the variety of approaches and attitudes adopted.

(i) Specific treatment

10. The participants appeared unanimous in stressing the specificity of higher education, and hence the need for authority to operate in a special way, and have special links with authority in the community. Defining policy and assigning resources is bound to be a matter for the community. On the other hand, participants were divided about the legitimacy of social control over the operation of the university.

(ii) Autonomy

11. The theme which generated the lengthiest discussion was certainly autonomy.

Several fundamental observations were made and, although not unanimously accepted, they may be taken as indicating the general analysis:

12. (a) The concept of autonomy, like that of independence or liberty, is a concept of relations, and the parties involved must accordingly be identified. Autonomy vis-à-vis the State, the local community, business and political forces are all different matters, and in each case dependence, where it exists, is not the same either.

13. (b) A distinction must be made between individual academic freedom, which is necessary for all intellectual work and may apply vis-à-vis the university itself, and the university's autonomy as an institution. There are in fact cases of autonomous institutions that seek to restrict the academic freedom of their members. The point for discussion is institutional autonomy, and it was noted that some definitions of the university limit it substantially.

Mention was in fact made, with examples, of certain institutions refusing to exert their authority. The university guards its autonomy rather than making use of it.

14. (c) The question of autonomy ultimately leads on to the nature of authority in universities. Our Swiss colleagues stressed the importance of an "internal" university government in contact with the Boards which may and should give expression to outside demand; at the same time this should never mean governance or control from outside. In that sense, boards of trustees, even when their members are drawn from outside the university, would not appear to represent external control.

(iii) Participation

15. The following observations should be noted on the theme of participation, bearing in mind the basic postures which at times generated radically divergent replies to the question "Who should and may participate?".

16. (a) Participation may be viewed either as an essential facet of autonomy, marking the existence of a democratic and open form of operation that legitimates autonomy, or as a separate question dealing only with the forms of internal governance.

17. (b) Participation may have two distinct functions, joined or separate:

- it may allow the needs of the various direct or indirect partners to be expressed within the university, and hence be the starting point for analysing and comparing these requirements;
- it may be part of a decision-making process in which the various agents in the university, and certain external partners, are associated in varied and generally weighted forms. The latter approach, embodied in reforms recently introduced in a number of Member countries, when it only involves a modification of the composition of university governing boards appears to give mediocre results. An exception is the Swedish case where new interaction strengthen both the university and the community.

18. Participation differs from body to body: university boards, faculty boards, departments, etc. According to circumstances, particular areas of self-determination may be recognised, or committee rule will prevail with, to use the expression of Mr. Lämmert (Federal Republic of Germany), "a system of rigid majorities and unhappy minorities". This demonstrates that majority rule may perhaps not be applied to universities without discouraging all innovation and negating their unique characteristics.

Lastly, it should be noted that criticism of internal or external participation springs from two very different approaches. When participation by students and staff is criticised, it is self-management of a collective enterprise by its users that is rejected; when participation by "people outside" is criticised, it is social control that is rejected.

Participation thus has no clear and single meaning, any more than autonomy.

(iv) Democracy and efficiency

19. The fourth issue was not extensively discussed, no doubt because it relates to two disparate dimensions: the political dimension on the one hand, and the functional and organisational dimension on the other. It was simply mentioned that democracy should not be equated with management by committee or assembly (and hence, inefficient management), and that strong authority and consistent organisation could equally well be democratic.

New partners and new functions

20. The consideration of the responses to the four questions outlined above formed what may be termed the legal, and largely "defensive" side of the discussions. On Wednesday morning we looked at the positive side of autonomy. Exercising autonomy is in fact having the courage to face new partners and embark upon new action. There are several dimensions to this; it is no longer simply a matter of inviting people from outside to sit on boards. Autonomy entails:

- making the institution's own resources available to the environment, and making full use of the environment's resources;
- embarking on new educational action, not simply by giving new population groups access to higher courses and qualifications, but by actively responding to demand;
- embarking on research into community and business problems, not through projects tacked on to traditional research but ones which will modify it through recurrent circuits;
- participating in the analysis of social demand;
- above all, not thinking in terms of a descending hierarchy, from national to regional to local, but considering that regional action is fundamental and may help to develop the interdisciplinary balance of education.

There was a striking degree of unanimity among the participants on the importance of these new functions. The difficulties - possible political conflicts, the need to modify attitudes and working methods - were by no means overlooked. But the trend of thought here would indicate that, looking beyond the crisis, a new momentum is appearing, no longer a defence of long-held bastions, rather the reactivation of the traditional mission of the university. Only by accepting questioning by and sometimes intervention from persons whose views are derived from outside the university, can this reactivation be achieved.

21. In order to reflect the discussions a number of incidental but nonetheless significant observations should also be noted:

(a) The Working Group as a whole did not lay particular emphasis on the effects of the widespread contraction of funding for the various issues discussed. It was simply stated that greater strains might be generated and that narrow corporatism was liable to hold greater sway, under the pretext of autonomy;

(b) The distinction between private and public institutions, although it leads to a different extension of university responsibilities, was not unanimously accepted as a pertinent one.

(c) The question of the pattern of authority leads on to the possibility of disputes and the need for arbitration procedures, but this aspect was referred to rather than explored in detail. The Canadian solution, where the various social partners participate in an independent commission, positioned between the institutions and the provincial governments, appeared to be a sound approach.

22. The Working Group did not refer to a number of significant points in the Overview document, and would accordingly appear to have adopted them:

(a) the recent trends in traditionally decentralised countries which seem to be extending their planning intervention, and in traditionally centralised countries which are implementing policies of decentralisation;

(b) the importance of the mass education process and the size of institutions as obstacles to participation and decision-making;

(c) on the other hand, while the special link between autonomy and research was strongly emphasized, in particular by our Japanese, Italian and Swiss colleagues, the relation between autonomy and capacity for critical thinking about society as a whole, which was stressed by a Finnish participant in the Plenary Session, was not referred to with the same emphasis. That is perhaps the real and most disturbing sign of the effects of the current crisis.

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NEW PATTERNS OF AUTHORITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

The present report has been prepared under the Education Committee programme on Policies for Higher Education. It has been written by Rune Premfors in his capacity as consultant to the Secretariat.

It is circulated for reference and information.

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Introduction

Who should govern higher education? Issues related to governance of higher education institutions have often been at the centre of public debate in OECD countries at least since the mid-1960s. To be sure the salience of such issues has varied greatly between national settings and over time. In countries like France, Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands they have dominated the policy agenda in higher education for extended periods. In other countries, such as Australia, Ireland and the United States, they have only rarely aroused public attention. In a large number of Member countries sweeping reforms of governance in higher education have been adopted from the late 1960s and onwards. In other countries changes have been more piecemeal and the results of variable responses by individual institutions rather than consequences of comprehensive national reform. And while many developments in higher education governance are common to most or all OECD countries, the variation is great with respect to the scope and depth of change.

This paper represents an effort to survey the evolving patterns of authority in the higher education system of the OECD countries. In the next section we try to outline the major characteristics of the traditional patterns of authority. Then an attempt is made to depict the various pressures for change experienced by higher education systems during the transformation from elite to mass institutions. A note on the process of reform is then made before we turn to descriptions of the contents of reform, first at the central level and then within institutions. Finally, in the concluding section, a summary of earlier observations and some new data provide the materials for a discussion of the new patterns of authority in higher education.

Traditional Patterns of Authority

Every nation's higher education system has many unique features with respect to governance; indeed every institution probably has. However, it seems safe to say that higher education is more suited to international comparison than many other social institutions. A limited number of basic organisational models seem to have had an extraordinary impact on developments around the world(1). This has made it both possible and worthwhile to identify major differences in terms of authority structures between systems, and have them constitute the bases for a limited number of subtypes. Burton Clark, in particular, has made a successful attempt to construct what is called "modes of governance". He identifies four major types: the European, British, American and Japanese modes(2). If we let the rest of the English-speaking members of OECD belong to the British mode, or, in the case of Canada, perhaps to the American mode, and if post-war Yugoslavia is allowed to form its own category, then the resulting classificatory scheme covers all countries.

The bulk of the Member countries would consequently be classified as European, or, using an alternative term, Continental. The central features of this mode of governance have traditionally been the autocratic rule of chair-holders and the relatively important role of central Ministries in regulating higher education. They may be characterised as systems which were strong at the top and at the bottom but weak at the middle level. The full professors (die Ordinarien of the archetypical German university, il baroni in Italy, les mandarins in France etc.) ruled supreme with respect to professional matters within their institutions, but were also very influential in national decision-making. Non-professorial staff were extremely dependent on the chair-holder of their discipline. The common business of institutions was decided upon in committees of all full professors. The head of the institution, the Rector, was primus inter pares, elected for a year or two, and only expected to act on the basis of near-consensus among chair-holders.

This "professors' university" as it has been aptly called(3) was dominant in virtually all countries of Western Europe until the 1960s. Variations certainly existed among national settings and, in addition, among institutions in individual nations. To illustrate, Austrian universities never enjoyed the autonomy in professional matters which characterised the German universities; Scandinavian professors seem never to have been as powerful within their institutions as, for example, their French and Turkish colleagues; Italian and Spanish professors seem to have few or no equals in terms of their influence in national policy-making in higher education; etc. And in general, and quite expectedly, non-university public institutions have enjoyed less autonomy vis-à-vis government and less academic self-governance internally.

The British mode of governance differs from the Continental in at least two important respects. First, institutions have been considerably more autonomous in relation to central government. In Britain the organisational expression of this fact has been the University Grants Committee. Founded in 1919 to allocate public funds to the universities it is dominated by prominent academics. The universities are, in legal terms, individually chartered corporations. The perceived success of the UGC has inspired the other English-speaking countries to set up similar bodies. In Canada there is no nation-wide counterpart, but five individual provinces and one region comprising three provinces have such intermediate bodies modelled on the British UGC(4). Second, within institutions, the British-type authority structure tends to be less hierarchical than the European. There have been more professors, and smaller status differences between professors and other staff. Departments began early to replace chairs as the basic organisational unit. In contrast with virtually all Continental systems, the governing boards of British universities have been dominated by laymen. These "external representatives" have been local, regional or national notables, not agents of interest groups or

political parties. In the course of the 20th century, the role of these laymen boards seem to have been reduced, and then in favour of academic self-governance(5).

In the American mode of governance the influence of boards of laymen or trustees has been considerable, largely at the expense of academics. American universities have traditionally adhered to a strong institutional leadership - president and deans - and considerable institution-wide bureaucracies. At the basic-unit level departments were important already towards the end of the 19th century, and departments have normally comprised several professors. Above the institutional level, higher education has been the responsibility of the states. Until recently virtually no efforts were made by federal authorities to coordinate higher education(6).

According to Clark, the traditional Japanese authority structure in higher education is in many ways similar to the European mode, but it contains significant elements from the British and American modes as well(7). The subsector comprising the so-called Imperial Universities at the pinnacle of the system has displayed the same mixture of professorial power and ministerial bureaucracy which characterised the traditional systems of Western Europe. But other subsectors have been different in many respects. The large private sector - making up more than three-fourths of all institutions in Japan - have many features in common with the private university sector of the United States.

Finally, we shall, for the sake of completeness, let Yugoslavia form a category of its own. Yugoslavian institutions of higher education have been illustrations of the concept of Gruppenuniversität more than a decade before that notion spread throughout Western Europe. Almost needless to say, this was due to the application of the idea of self-management to all sectors of Yugoslav society. Higher education was simply never considered as an exception. All groups within the institutions, including students, should share in decision-making. And a large number of outside interests were represented on governing bodies as well. In reality much power seems to be concentrated, as in the pre-reform institutions, in the traditional Faculties where the dominance of professors is great(8).

These brief outlines of five different traditional modes of governance in the OECD countries should serve as starting points for the following discussion of change. The usefulness of the classificatory scheme is, in our view, proved by the different ability of the different modes to survive the pressures for change associated with the onslaught of mass higher education. It should come as no surprise that the European systems were to change in the most drastic fashion. But more on the contents of reform later; first it seems worthwhile to examine briefly the nature of the pressures for change.

Pressures for Change

It is often said, and no less true for that, that quantitative growth has been a crucial force behind virtually every major change in higher education in recent decades(9). Issues related to growth were dominating the policy agenda in most OECD countries before student demands, in some cases violent protests, made governance and "order" the most pressing matters for many governments. From the mid-1970s quantitative concerns were again emerging as the primary problems, but now in the form of efforts to economize and even cut public spending in absolute figures.

The relationship between quantitative development and governance is certainly complex. In very simple terms we may identify two major impacts of growth on patterns of authority in higher education. First, growth stimulates public attention. In the 1960s in particular, higher education was one of the fastest growing sectors of OECD economies. The number of people affected in one way or another by developments in this policy area trebled or more in a few years. While higher education could in its elite form exercise the freedom of irrelevance, to use a phrase by Halsey and Trow, this was no longer possible in the era of mass higher education. Governments and other centres of power in society increasingly held expectations about the performance of higher education and research.

Second, growing size creates problems of coordination in any organisation. To govern a small institution is a very different task indeed, as for example Clark Kerr noted in the 1960s, compared to the running of a huge multiversity. Not only growing size *per se* is characteristic of modern higher education, but also increasing specialisation(10). Unless a system consists of very loosely coupled elements, growing size and complexity creates a need for more coordination and also a system-wide bureaucracy to assist in the coordination effort.

While the "pressure of numbers" and the growing complexity of purpose must be seen as basic factors behind the transformation of authority patterns in higher education, two slightly more specific factors seem to have been equally important. First, there is the oft-discussed impact of student unrest and demands for participation. There is no room to dwell on this vast topic here; let us just note that it affected governance structures in at least two ways: student protests incited central government action in many countries, and thus reduced institutional autonomy, and as demands were met they also led to a more influential role for students in decision-making. As is well-known, the severity of protests varied greatly among the OECD nations, as did the lasting impacts on higher education governance.

Another more specific factor is of some interest. It is often noted in analyses of changing authority patterns in higher education that the group which may well have profited most is the intermediate and junior teaching staff. In European systems

where they were often extremely dependent on chair-holders this seems particularly true. No doubt this has partly been a consequence of student demands. Junior staff often participated in student protests. In addition, they seem often to have been mobilised as a counterforce to students and other non-teaching groups. However, the chief point to be made here is that the basic factor behind their growing influence was, simply, their growing numbers. In the old elite systems of the Continental kind, they were often outnumbered by full professors; in the emerging mass systems they were soon many, many more. The traditional relationship between chair-holders and non-professorial staff rested on dependence and personal loyalty; the conditions for this type of authority structure are simply not present in a situation where non-professorial staff outnumbers chair-holders perhaps ten to one. For a majority of the former collective gains in status and influence become primary goals.

Finally, any list of pressures for change with respect to higher education governance must relate developments in this policy area to broader social and policy trends. It is, of course, commonplace to observe that while welfare state planning spread throughout the Western world in the postwar years, this development was from around the mid-1960s made increasingly complex by demands for participation and autonomy. Whether as voters, consumers or producers, large numbers of people in the OECD countries expressed their dissatisfaction with public and private organisations. Schemes of industrial democracy and efforts to boost regional and local self-governance are but two examples of this trend. Higher education was in this larger context only an illustration of the more general phenomenon. At the same time it seems to have been a pioneering sector in many countries; undoubtedly this must have been due to its major "client group", the students. In addition, higher education may have been susceptible to demands for autonomy and participation because of the fact that these features have traditionally characterised the sector(11).

In recent years these social and policy trends have obviously subsided in many OECD countries. Stagnating economies and a spreading pessimism about the prospects for social reform have provided the impetus for demands for efficiency in public activities. In many countries pressures are mounting on higher education to accept a more active role in economic recovery. Governments and other powerful actors expect more value for money - in higher education and elsewhere.

Reform Processes

As we shall see in more detail later, the nature of traditional authority structures have obviously been of importance for the contents of reform; some systems have had to change in more profound ways than others. It is equally obvious that the

inherited authority structures to some significant extent determined the nature of the process of reform. We may in parallel with Margaret Archer in her seminal work on educational change, talk of more or less policy-directed change(12). While in some OECD countries, established authority structures made anything but policy-directed change unlikely, comprehensive reforms through central political action were completely out of the question in others. In centralised, Continental systems like France and Sweden national legislation was necessary; nobody contemplated the possibility that institutions could be allowed to "legislate" for themselves. The somewhat paradoxical result was that when both countries attempted a decentralisation of decision-making power, this had to be done through detailed regulations. In a country like the United Kingdom, such comprehensive legislation would have implied a revolution in the State - university relations(13).

In a more extended time perspective such "political cultures" of a policy area do of course change. After all, that is one way of describing the general movement toward greater state intervention in higher education that has occurred in recent decades in most OECD countries. Coordination and planning by central government has become increasingly legitimate. In the federal countries, constitutional rules have often prohibited comprehensive, nation-wide reform. The policy area of education has normally been the concern of the Land, canton, province or state. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bund acquired considerably greater power in higher education through a change in the Constitution in 1969. In Switzerland central government has failed in its efforts to do likewise. In the other federal countries, piecemeal changes have added up to a greater role for the federal authorities without any changes in the formal distribution of authority between governmental levels.

Most countries of Western Europe have in the course of the late 1960s and the 1970s adopted major reforms in the area of higher education governance: France 1968; Netherlands 1970 and 1972; Denmark 1970 and 1973; Belgium 1971; Italy 1974; Austria 1975; Sweden 1975/77; Western Germany 1976. All these reforms were comprehensive in the sense that they at least applied to all universities. Important reforms, but less comprehensive, have been adopted in Norway, Finland, and towards the end of the 1970s in the formerly authoritarian regimes of Portugal, Greece and Spain.

This enumeration may give the impression that these reforms were only very indirectly related to the phenomenon of "1968". Detailed case histories show, however, that the relationship is intimate in most or all countries. While Sweden, for example, adopted a comprehensive legislation in the Riksdag through two consecutive decisions in 1975 and 1977, these were in many respects only modifications of "experimental" rules which had been applied to university governance since 1969. When the very

limited student unrest occurred in Sweden in the spring of 1968, the authorities actually responded very quickly; within a month an ad hoc committee was preparing the "experimental" activity(14). Or, to take another example, while the Bundestag of the Federal Republic did not adopt the Hochschulrahmengesetz until 1976, the initial responses to the widespread student unrest in Germany in 1967 occurred immediately in many Länder. And the first version of the framework law for higher education was proposed in 1970(15).

The non-European systems which have normally experienced less policy-directed reform efforts in the area of higher education governance were, however, not unaffected by student unrest. As is well-known, Japan and some institutions in the United States were the scenes of some of the most violent protests. The responses, however, occurred normally at the level of institutions (apart from police actions). And, as we shall discuss in greater detail later, the disenfranchised groups did not gain much in the process.

Reforms of Central Policy-Making

In this section we shall focus on changes in the government machinery, for planning and coordination of higher education, including the issue of institutional autonomy vis-à-vis that machinery. In a more complete discussion of autonomy and accountability in higher education, other relationships should be included as well. Other forces than government may well impinge on autonomy, and there is nothing self-evident in the choice of the institution as the entity which should enjoy it(16).

All OECD countries have strengthened their central capacity for policy analysis and coordination in higher education in recent decades. In some instances they have virtually only done what has been necessitated by growth: the relevant department or agency has needed more staff just to stay at the same level of ambition. The development of the British UGC may illustrate: from having about six professional people on staff in the early 1950s, it increased to some 140 in the mid-1970s. However, some observers have argued that the role of the UGC has actually changed dramatically in the intervening period: from being a "buffer" between the universities and central government it has allegedly been transformed into an "arm of central government", no different from other government departments. Such a tendency can indeed be observed, but in comparison with most other countries, central planning and coordination is still very weak in the United Kingdom. This is largely true also of the non-university sector because of the role of local authorities. British education is still "a national system locally administered"(17). In the United States and Canada, the nation-wide coordination is also weak. But at the level of states and provinces, a considerable build-up of capabilities has occurred. Beginning in the 1950s, virtually every state in

the United States has created a state-wide board of higher education(18). In Canada, many provinces have, as was mentioned earlier, created UGC-like coordination bodies. Four of the ten provinces also have separate government departments for higher education(19). In Australia the creation of a Commission on Tertiary Education in 1977 marked a new, more activist role for the federal level in planning and coordinating higher education(20). And in Japan, the government decided in the mid-1970s to take a much greater responsibility for private higher education.

In the more centralised, European systems, the growth of central staff has of course been at least as great, probably significantly greater, and many structural reforms of the coordinating machinery have been implemented. In Sweden, for example, the central agency responsible for higher education was in the early postwar period only concerned with the universities and a few major colleges. It was staffed by only a few professionals, and its head, the University Chancellor, was elected by the Swedish professoriate. During the 1950s and 1960s the staff grew rapidly, and in 1964 the Chancellor's Office was transformed to a regular state agency with a regular general director as its head, appointed by the Cabinet. In 1976 it was once more reformed. Today, the National Board of Universities and Colleges (its present name) has a staff well above 200 and is responsible for all post-secondary education in Sweden(21).

France is another case in point. The department responsible for higher education (mainly the universities, since the grandes écoles are to a large extent administered by other ministries) within the Ministry of Education grew rapidly in the postwar years and soon constituted "a ministry within a ministry". For a mixture of reasons this department was in 1974 allowed to form a so-called Autonomous State Secretariate, and then in 1976 an independent Ministry. The Ministry is now an impressive coordinating body employing several hundred professionals(22).

In many Continental systems, advisory bodies of a permanent character have been created. Examples are provided by Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. However, it is also of some interest to note that much of the coordination effort in higher education has been accomplished by ad hoc bodies of various kinds. Their mandate and impact have varied greatly, but in many instances they have been instrumental in furthering a "systemic" perspective on higher education. The Robbins Committee in Britain (1961-63) is an early example; before Robbins, higher education in the United Kingdom was rarely or never considered as "a system"(23). In Sweden the well-known U68 Committee established a systemic view with respect to all post-secondary education(24). Examples from other countries abound. In Japan, the so-called Ad Hoc Study Committee was, when it was created in 1973, the first effort in that country to set up a long-term plan for all higher education(25). The

Williams committee in Australia seems to have been of equal significance in that context(26). And in the United States a private initiative, the well-known Carnegie Commission, implied a large-scale effort at nation-wide policy analysis. Its impact can hardly be compared to that of major government commissions, but it cannot be considered negligible(27).

While regional coordination has expectedly been of importance in federal countries, it is of some interest to note that some unitary states have attempted to strengthen this form of coordination as well. As part of its major reform in 1977, Sweden established six regions of higher education. Each region has a board composed according to the Gruppenprinzip, but with a clear majority for political parties and interest organisations. The role of the Regional Boards has been somewhat ambiguous from the start. In Norway, the corresponding regional boards are only responsible for the well-known regional colleges, allowing the universities to stay out of this coordination effort. The French Orientation Law of 1968 contains provisions for regional coordination of higher education; they remain, however, unimplemented. Italy and Finland are other instances where regionalisation has been part of public policy in higher education. In the case of the United Kingdom, efforts in this direction may safely be called a failure; instead, a large share of the public sector institutions, the polytechnics, are now on the verge of freeing themselves from their links with the local authorities(28).

Another trend which can only be briefly noted here is the waning of truly private higher education. Few or no institutions are entirely private in the sense that they receive no government funds whatsoever. In Japan and the United States, the two countries where private higher education is still very important, the financial troubles of these institutions are growing. In countries like Belgium and Holland where some important private institutions still exist, these are almost entirely financed out of the public purse. In most OECD countries, private institutions are of marginal importance(29).

Burton Clark is certainly correct in his general argument with respect to national policymaking in higher education(30):

> "There is an increase in the influence of elected officials and those appointed to top offices by political parties and regimes. Such officials assume more responsible, assertive and intrusive postures. More issues in higher education are divided along the lines of party politics, legislative coalitions, and power exchanges among central executives. Committees on higher education policy are formed within the party, the legislature, and the minister's own office."

While true everywhere, this trend towards "politicisation" has been particularly evident in Western Europe. It is of course clearly associated with the advent of mass higher

education. National policy-making for elite higher education was largely a "private" process, whether it occurred among a few Oxbridge alumini in a London club as in the United Kingdom, or in nominally more public negotiations between a few professors and some ministry officials as in most Continental systems. In neither case did higher education issues stir up much interest outside a small circle of proximate policy-makers.

However, once the trend has been identified, it seems worthwhile to be a bit more nuanced with respect to the "politicisation" of national policy-making in higher education. First, at least if we are to judge from a detailed study of France, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the "politicisation" process largely occurred in the 1960s; in the early 1980s, the political salience of higher education has decreased in most OECD countries. Second, the policy area of higher education remains in most national settings a minor concern in national politics. Few political notables take an interest; rarely has the policy area aroused controversies in elections; public policies on higher education are still decided upon in relatively confined subsystems of policy-makers, not in "macropolitical" settings of general elections, parliamentary debates and party conferences(31). Higher education enters such macropolitical settings only in very exceptional circumstances: the phenomenon of "1968" was such a case; Belgium in 1967 with a combination of long-standing conflicts over language and ethnic differences and student unrest is another case; and the role of universities as bases for the opposition to the authoritarian regimes of Spain, Portugal and Greece provides a third kind of circumstance.

A third type of observation which may add nuances to the overall trend towards a greater role for the centre in higher education policy-making, is the already mentioned attempt in some countries to decentralise. James Perkings noted a decade ago that while most countries were moving "from autonomy to systems", some of the more centralised ones in terms of their authority structure in higher education were beginning to take cautious steps in the opposite direction(32). Sweden and France were obvious examples. More recently, post-Franco Spain has made ambitious efforts of decentralisation.

Undoubtedly, these efforts have partly been inspired by necessity. Neil Smelser has put it well with respect to public higher education in California(33) :

> "As a system grows and becomes more complex, it becomes progressively unmanageable if day-by-day authority continues to rest with the central agency; although ultimate authority may still continue to reside in that agency, it becomes imperative to delegate operative authority to lower levels. Often, however, the decentralisation lags behind the realities of growth".

The decentralisation of "operative authority" has been considerable in some of the Continental systems as national policies have

become increasingly comprehensive and ambitious. It has clearly contributed to the widespread sense of "overload" in institutional governance.

Reforms of Institutional Governance

In the OECD countries the following groups of actors have been identified as important in discussions of institutional governance:

(a) full professors
(b) senior teaching and research staff
(c) junior teaching and research staff
(d) administrative and technical staff
(e) students
(f) external representatives.

As for the organisational structure of institutions it seems reasonable to simplify somewhat and talk of three levels: top, middle and basic level. In this context the top level means the institution-wide governing body; the middle level stands for the governing body of the Faculty (in the European sense) or, as is sometimes the case, a cluster of study programmes; finally, the basic level of the organisation is normally a department, an institute or a chair(34).

The traditional patterns have been indicated already. In the Continental systems governing bodies at all levels were often composed of full professors only. The basic unit was the chair. The power of the professors was intimately linked with the chair system. It is quite natural, then, that the waning of professorial power in European universities has been predicated on the replacement of the chair system with a more democratic structure. In some Continental systems, for example in Scandinavia, the process has actually been piecemeal; department structures began to develop already in the 1940s. In other systems - French, German and Italian universities are good illustrations - changes have been imposed from above quite abruptly through recent reforms. Anyway, the traditional chair system is now rare in Europe. Whether as Fachbereiche (Germany), UER (unités d'enseignement et de recherche, France), vakgroep (Holland) or institution (Sweden), departments have virtually everywhere become the basic organisational unit. The trend is clear even if some systems keep a mixed set-up of chairs and departments; Turkey is a case in point, as is Japan where the traditional chair (kōza) still seems viable in many institutions(35

In this connection it may be mentioned that in some countries the category of full professor has been widened, again no doubt a development inspired by the United States model. The Federal Republic and Sweden are illustrations of this kind of reform.

The basic level of the reformed Continental institutions are now normally governed by a board where professors share power with other groups, in particular other teaching and research staff and students. We rarely find simple formulae like Drittelparität. Austria comes close, as does Sweden. In the latter case the three categories of teachers/researchers (all kinds), students and technical/administrative personnel are represented; no category may, however, have more than half of the places on the department board. In Denmark the proportions are 2:1:1(36). French universities are the only institutions where external representatives are found at the basic level. This is, however, volutionary; the UERs may decide themselves whether to include them or not(37).

In most systems teachers and researchers must still be a majority in the governing bodies of departments. In German universities full professors, and in Holland and Belgium tenured staff, must form such a majority(38).

Outside Western Europe, non-professorial staff and particularly students have a much weaker formal position in the governance of the basic units. Students are normally only allowed to sit on various ad hoc working parties or strictly advisory bodies, although it should be added that institutions vary considerably in this regard.

Finally, it should be remembered that the power vested in departments varies greatly between systems. There seems to be a correlation, although far from perfect, between a strong formal position of students in decision-making bodies and a relatively weak position of departments. Sometimes - France is an illustrative case - representative bodies are not allowed to decide upon issues like appointments and research, i.e. issues traditionally considered to be within the domain where strict meritocratic principles should apply.

At the middle level of the reformed Continental institutions, roughly the same principles of representation seem to apply as at the basic level. In some systems, however, external representatives now enter the picture in a more systematic manner. In Sweden, where undergraduate training on one hand and post-graduate education and research on the other are governed by separate bodies, committees for undergraduate programmes (linjenämnder) contain representatives from relevant areas of working life (one-third). In e.g. German institutions, curricular committees often have such representatives, but such committees are only advisory.

It has been noted about the middle level that even if the Gruppenprinzip apply to the same extent as at the basic level, managerial leadership now becomes more important. Deans and committee chairmen of various kinds increasingly run the show; but more on that below.

It is at the top level of institutions where the group principle has been implemented most forcefully in European institutions of higher education in recent years. And it is at this level, of course, where something similar has been part of the traditional heritage of, for example, the U.S., Canadian and British institutions.

Most institution-wide governing bodies of European institutions now contain external representatives. In Sweden and France this was a major controversy in the reform process. In the former country a vehement opposition by the universities succeeded in reducing the proportion of external representatives to one-third. The governing body of a major Swedish institution (högskolestyrelse) is now composed as follows:

6 representing "public interests"
4 representing "the activity of the institution"
3 representing trade unions of the institution
3 representing the students
1 rector
1 head of administration.

The six representatives of "public interests" are actually agents of the political parties (appointed by municipal and county councils in the area) and of trade unions and the major employers' organisations(39).

In France the conseil d'université should have between one-sixth and one-third of their members appointed "on the basis of their personal competence and in particular their regional activities". In practice the high degree of political conflict surrounding French universities have led to a "politicisation" of this representation as well(40). A final example of the group principle as applied to the top-level governing bodies of institutions can be taken from Belgium. The following proportions are found in two Belgian universities (Ghent and Liège):

10 representing the teaching corps
4 representing scientific personnel
4 representing students
3 representing "society"
3 representing "economy"
3 representing state and local government
2 representing technical/administrative staff
1 rector
1 vice-rector.

The proportions are different in other Belgian universities, but the groups represented are the same(41).

Some European systems have refrained from external representation altogther. The Federal Republic and Denmark are examples. In the latter case the usual 2:1:1 rule applies(42).

As indicated already, there is considerable variation with respect to the mechanisms for appointing representatives to governing bodies. In many European systems, "general elections" within various constituencies play an important role, especially in the case of students. As for external representatives, an important distinction may be drawn between those instances where these are agents of external interest groups and political parties, and where they are appointed to governing bodies predominantly on the basis of personal qualifications. In most European systems, the former principle is adhered to, while in most non-European systems this is a rare practice. In Sweden, a combination of political and interest organisation representation permeates the whole system since 1977, but France and Norway (only the regional college sector) are not far behind(43). One should remember, however, that the influence of interest groups may be great in other systems as well. In the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, business interests are well represented on governing bodies. A substantial share of the roughly 47,000 members of the governing boards of some 3,000 higher education institutions in the United States is made up of representatives of business corporations. This is, expectedly, particularly true of private institutions(44).

As was mentioned earlier, the rectors or presidents of Continental systems were far from powerful. They occupied their office for only short periods, and were not expected to act without consulting their colleagues, i.e. the other full professors. The reforms of recent years have often changed the position of rector or president quite dramatically. Today he or she is often elected by the most democratic constituency of the institution, and is formally or in practice serving for extended periods. In addition, the head of the institution has been freed from the constraints of other professors (often he or she is not even a professor) and commands a substantial administrative staff. This development has also occurred with respect to British vice-chancellors(45).

Concluding Discussion

The advent of mass higher education created a need for central coordination and planning. In all OECD countries higher education now occupies a more prominent role on the political agenda than before the period of explosive growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Central and other staff have increased considerably. Specialised bodies for coordination and analysis have been created. No doubt higher education systems still vary greatly with respect to centralisation and politicisation, and some countries have tried to decentralise decision-making power with at least partial success. But the trend towards central coordination has been pervasive in the OECD countries.

The second major trend has been towards participative forms of governance within institutions. The coming of mass higher education in combination with student unrest spelt death

to the traditional professors' university in Western Europe. Its autocratic structure of authority could not survive. It was succeeded by the group university. Comprehensive reforms provided very complex decision-making bodies with "graded" voting rights for all groups within the institutions. In no way did these schemes resemble the "one-person-one-vote" principle, but the reforms were radical considering the point of departure. Changes have been much less revolutionary in non-European systems of higher education. Still it seems safe to say that the trend towards greater participation has been evident there as well.

With the exception of Portugal, Greece and Spain where the fall of authoritarian regimes created new opportunities for reform in the latter half of the 1970s, there has in recent years been a tendency towards a "backlash" in many countries. The Hochschulrahmengesetz of the Federal Republic, for example, represented in many ways a reaction to many of the Länder schemes then in operation (1976). In Holland, student influence has been curtailed to some extent. In France, the implementation of the Orientation Law may well be described as a more than ten-year long effort on the part of the French government to resurrect central power and to limit the influence of students within the universities. On two occasions this has even included changes in the Law itself (1975 and 1980)(46).

Other developments than those analysed so far in this paper have obviously been of consequence to the changing patterns of authority in higher education. For example, the unionisation of academic staff is often cited, as is the generally greater role of trade unions within institutions. It is sometimes argued that the spread of decision-making through bargaining between employer and trade unions has preempted the authority of representative bodies. Nowhere does this seem to be more true than in Sweden, where industrial democracy in the form of such bargaining (known by the acronym "MBL" which stands for "Law of Co-Determination") has spread to all public agencies and institutions.

Furthermore, the courts have become increasingly important for higher education in many OECD countries. A well-known decision by the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic in 1972 implied that full professors had to form a majority in decision-making organs concerned with matters of teaching and research; this court ruling meant the end of experiments with Drittelparität. Interestingly, the courts in Austria have ruled in the opposite direction(47). Quite expectedly, the courts have also been influential in the United States, perhaps in particular with respect to admission (e.g. the much publicised Bakke case) and other issues associated with so-called affirmative action.

Finally, there is the trend towards bureaucratisation in higher education. It is a concept which is often used to denote several things: the increasing number of administrators, the

(illegitimate) power of bureaucrats, and the proliferation of (unnecessary) paper work. There is little doubt that the number of administrators has grown at all levels of higher education systems. It was noted earlier that there was a difference between on the one hand the Continental systems with a very thin bureaucracy within institutions and on the other non-European systems, notably the U.S. one, with more numerous staff at that level. With the onslaught of mass higher education, bureaucracies have grown at every level, but probably most significantly within institutions in the European systems. Reliable information on this development is scarce. In the case of Western Germany, it is reported that the number of senior professional administrators in universities numbered only 60 in 1965 but about 800 a decade later(48).

For Sweden more detailed data are available. It may, first, be noted that the number of professional administrators grew roughly at the same pace as the number of teachers and researchers during the 1960s. In the 1970s, however, the picture was very different. While the teaching and research staff doubled during the years 1969 to 1978 (from about 7,000 to 14,000), the number of professional administrators trebled (from 640 to about 1,900). If we separate teaching from research (which is a quite feasible operation in the Swedish context) we find that it is the research function which has lagged behind teaching and administration(49).

The growth of bureaucracy in higher education is in all probability not only due to size but to the concomitant multiplication of purposes as well. While elite institutions were in most countries only expected to teach and do basic research at the highest level, the mass institutions of today are heavily involved in all kinds of social problem-solving, including strongly vocational education and detailed policy research.

Whether the result of policy-directed reforms or of piecemeal changes within institutions, participation itself has clearly furthered bureaucracy (in all three senses of the term mentioned above). The growth of bureaucracy - in European systems in particular - should to an important extent be viewed as a response to the impotence and lack of efficiency of the new decision-making organs. Democracy does of course breed bureaucracy in many situations. In higher education it has also stimulated an interest in management efficiency. This has occurred in parallel with a noticeable decline in active participation in governance, particularly on the part of students. From some countries, such as France, we have solid data on these developments but the trend is reported from virtually every country(50). The importance of representative bodies seems to be declining. Due to the inefficient operation of such bodies, institutions try to find ways to reduce their dependence on them. While formal powers remain with the assembly, real power becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of a

few high-level administrators and some activist professors. Managerial leadership gains a new significance, especially at the top and middle level of institutions; at the basic level there seems to be room for more democratic governance and collective leadership.

Notes

1) See e.g. Philip Altbach, Comparative Higher Education: Research Trends and Bibliography (London 1979).

2) Burton Clark, "Academic Power: Concepts, Modes and Perspectives", in John Van de Graaff et al, Academic Power: Patterns of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education (New York 1978), pp. 164-189.

3) Roger Geiger, "European Universities: The Unfinished Revolution", Comparative Education Review, 22, 2 (June 1978), pp. 189-211.

4) Edward Sheffield et al, Systems of Higher Education: Canada (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978), p.193.

5) Graeme Moodie & Rowland Eustace, Power and Authority in British Universities (Edinburgh 1974), pp. 42f.

6) Burton Clark, "United States", in Van de Graaff et al, Academic Power, pp. 104 123; also Alan Pifer et al, Systems of Higher Education: United States (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978).

7) Burton Clark, "The Japanese System of Higher Education in Comparative Perspective", Yale Higher Education Research Group, Working Paper YHERG-33 (1979); also Katsuya Narita, Systems of Higher Education: Japan (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978).

8) Geoffrey Giles, "Higher Education in Yugoslavia", Yale Higher Education Research Group, Working Paper YHERG-39 (1979).

9) For a classical statement, see Martin Trow, "Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass Higher Education", in Policies for Higher Education (OECD, Paris 1974); for evidence of rethinking, Martin Trow, "Elite and Mass Higher Education: American Models and European Realities", in Research into Higher Education: Processes and Structures (National Board of Universities and Colleges, Stockholm 1979).

10) Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA 1963).

11) For a similar argument in the Swedish context, cf Olof Ruin, Studentmakt och statsmakt (Stockholm 1979), esp. pp. 149f.

12) Margaret Archer, Social Origins of Educational Systems (London 1979), esp. pp 266f.

13) Rune Premfors, The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective: France, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Stockholm 1980), Chapters 2 and 3 in particular.

14) Olof Ruin, "External Control and Internal Participation", in Hans Daalder & Edward Shils (eds.), Universities, Politicians and Bureaucrats (Cambridge, forthcoming 1981).

15) Gunther Kloss, "The Reform of University Government in Western Germany", in Stewart Armstrong (ed.), Decade of Change (Guildford 1979). Also Hansgert Peisert & Gerhild Framhein, Systems of Higher Education: Federal Republic of Germany (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978).

16) See Rune Premfors & Bertil Ostergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978), Chapter 6.

17) For the classical study of the UGC, cf. Robert Berdahl, British Universities and the State (Berkeley 1959); for an analysis of its changing role, see Maurice Kogan, Educational Policy-Making (London 1975), and John Pratt, "The UGC Department", Higher Education Review (Spring 1975).

18) Alan Pifer et al, Systems of Higher Education: United States, esp. pp. 65-73.

19) Edward Sheffield et al, Systems of Higher Education: Canada, p. 192.

20) Bruce Williams, Systems of Higher Education: Australia (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978), Chapter 4.

21) Rune Premfors & Bertil Ostergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden, pp. 22-25.

22) Alain Bienaymé, Systems of Higher Education: France (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978).

23) For a brief evaluation of Robbins, see Jack Embling, A Fresh Look at Higher Education (Amsterdam 1974), pp. 245.; for a more critical appraisal, John Pratt & Tyrrel Burgess, Polytechnics: A Report (Bath 1974), pp. 32-38.

24) Bo Lindensjö, Den svenska högskolereformen: En beslutsstudie (Stockholm, forthcoming 1981).

25) Katsuya Narita, Systems of Higher Education: Japan, pp. 49-55.

26) See the special issue of Higher Education (Vol. 9 No. 5, 1980) on the Williams Committee.

27) The Carnegie Commission issued well over 100 reports - more than 60 of them representing original research. Recently the Commission's chairman published an analysis of its impact in U.S. higher education, see Clark Kerr.

28) On the Swedish regions, see Premfors & Ostergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden, pp. 47f.; on the problem of regionalisation in European higher education, cf. the special issue of European Journal of Education, 14 (1979); the public sector's dependence on local authorities is a regular topic for discussion in Times Higher Education Supplement

29) See the forthcoming work by Roger Geiger, Private Sectors in Higher Education: An International Analysis.

30) Burton Clark, "Coordination: Patterns and Processes", in Clark Kerr et al, 12 Systems of Higher Education: 6 Decisive Issues (International Council for Educational Development, New York 1978), p. 82.

31) Rune Premfors, "Higher Education as a Political Issue area: A Comparative View of France, Sweden and the United Kingdom", Higher Education, 9 (1980), pp. 325-344.

32) James Perkins, "The Future of Coordination", in Perkins (ed.), Higher Education: From Autonomy to Systems (New York 1972), esp. p. 301.

33) Neil Smelser, "Growth, Structural Change, and Conflict in California Public Higher Education, 1950-1970", in Smelser & Gabriel Almond (eds.), Public Higher Education in California (Berkeley 1974), p. 129.

34) For more detailed discussions of "levels analysis", see John Van de Graaff et al, Academic Power, esp. pp. 3-6, 179f. Also Tony Becher & Maurice Kogan, Process and Structure in Higher Education (London 1980).

35) John Van de Graaff, "Can Department Structures Replace a Chair System? Comparative Perspectives", Yale Higher Education Research Group, Working Paper YHERG-46 (1980).

36) For information on Denmark: John Whitehead, "Danish Higher Education: Expansion, Crisis and Institution Building" and "The Danish System Revisited", Yale Higher EducationResearch Group, Working Papers YHERG-32 (1978) and YHERG-43 (1980). Also Mogens Pedersen, "State and University in Denmark: From Coexistence to Collision Course", in Daalder & Shils (eds.), Universities, Politicians and Bureaucrats.

37) See e.g. Isabel Boussard et al, Les institutions universitaire en France: Situation actuelle (Paris 1977).

38) For Belgium, Roger Geiger, "Universities and the State in Belgium: Past and Present Dimensions of Higher Educatior in a Divided Society", Yale Higher Education Research Group, Working Paper YHERG-29 (1978), and Jef Verhoeven, "The Belgian Universities under Crossfire: Linguistic Communalism, Bureaucratisation and Democratisation", in Daalder & Shils (eds.), Universities, Politicians and Bureaucrats. For Holland, Thomas Schuller, Higher Education and University

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39) Premfors, The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective, pp. 59f.

40) Boussard et al, Les institutions universitaires en France: Situation actuelle. See also e.g. John Van de Graaff & Dorotea Furth, "France", in Van de Graaff et al, Academic Power, pp. 49-66.

41) Geiger, "Universities and the State in Belgium...", p. 44.

42) Whitehead, "Danish Higher Education...", p.42.

43) For a discussion of the "corporativisation" of Swedish higher education, Olof Ruin, "External Control and Internal Participation"; see also Premfors, The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective, Chapters 2, 3 and 7.

44) Pifer et al, Systems of Higher Education: United States, p. 59.

45) For a comparative analysis, see John Van de Graaff... .

46) Premfors, The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective, Chapter 3; for recent developments, see Guy Neave's articles in the Times Higher Education Supplement 1979-81.

47) Erich Leitner, "Current Trends in Austrian Higher Education: The Call for a New Reform", European Journal of Education, 14, 1 (1979), pp. 59-67.

48) Figures cited from Guy Neave, "Accountability and Control", European Journal of Education, 15, 1 (1980), p. 50.

49) Jan-Erik Lane and Hans Stenlund, "Om byräkrati och högskolans byräkratisering", Tvärsnitt, 1 (1981), pp. 3-9.

50) See, in particular, Isabel Boussard, "Les étudiants et la participation: Les élections aux Conseils d'U.E.R. et d'Universités", Revue française de sociologie, XXI, 1 (1980), pp. 77-96.